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From the moment John Howard announced his plans to reshape industrial relations, WorkChoices changed the political debate. The legislation represented the biggest shake-up of industrial relations policy since Stanley Bruce's ill-fated attempt, nearly 80 years earlier, to repeal the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act (Lee 2010, Ch. 6 ). Yet, as the Treasurer's press secretary would later lament, WorkChoices 'seemed to come out of nowhere' (Savva 2010, 214 ; also Lewis 2008, 178-9) . It provoked the trade union movement into mounting 'one of the most brilliant campaigns in Australia's history' (Kelly 2009, 306) , failed to mobilise large parts of the business community in its defence (Howard 2011, 580, 585) and, with Labor committed to dismantling the legislation, began to spell the end of the Howard Government; like Bruce, Howard lost both the prime ministership and his own seat.
In this chapter we show how-thanks to the government, the trade union movement and the Opposition-the issue of industrial relations was transformed, virtually overnight. More precisely, we show how it went: from an issue of low electoral importance to an issue of high importance; from a policy, or series of policies, over which electors were divided to a policy on which opinion ran largely one way; and from something of a political strength for the government to something that loomed as a fatal weakness. Had respondents not rated the issue highly, WorkChoices would not have shifted votes, no matter how widespread the opposition. Had respondents been divided over the merits of the legislation, the government might have gained as many voters as it lost. Had respondents not seen a real difference between Labor and the Coalition on industrial relations it would not have affected their support for either party no matter how the issue was regarded (see Butler and Stokes 1969, Ch. 15 for the locus classicus of this model; for an earlier analysis of survey data on WorkChoices that omits the second condition, see Wilson 2005, 294) .
Nonetheless, as this chapter shows, data from the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA) together with data from public opinion polls commissioned by the press and surveys commissioned by others-notably the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU)-need to be handled with care. Indeed, there were moments where the outcome of the party battle might have depended on what the diverse data on public opinion-from polls, focus groups and the feedback from MPs-were taken to mean. Just how survey respondents regarded the legislation in relation to their vote very much depended on the other issues they were asked to rate. In responding to the issue, the options open to respondents also mattered; for example, the size of the opposition to the legislation was partly a function of whether the relevant question encouraged a non-committal response. In some cases, a reframing of the issue changed the balance of opinion; reactions to the unfair dismissal legislation were a spectacular instance of this. And on a number of the issues associated with the legislation the government was able to claw back some of the lost ground: whether the legislation would lead to higher wages, whether it would be bad 'for the average worker', and whether union powers in the workplace should be enhanced are examples of this. In the end, while the modification of the legislation made some aspects of the Coalition's reforms more acceptable to the electorate and while the gap over which of the two parties would best handle industrial relations might have narrowed, neither may have done much to stem the flow of votes to Labor.
WorkChoices brought to the surface a number of deep-seated cleavages in Australian society. In terms of social structure, there was the cleavage between young and old as well as the cleavage between unionists and non-unionists. Politically, there was the cleavage between respondents who thought of themselves as 'left' or 'right' as well as the cleavage around how respondents intended to vote. And in terms of attitudes to industrial relations there were cleavages over the classic issues of class: union power and employer prerogatives-a reflection of the attempt to remove what Howard characterised as 'the privileged position of the trade union movement' by means of 'aiding', as Paul Kelly put it, 'one side of the class divide' (Kelly 2009, 304, 307; also Norrington 2006, 102) .
The rise of industrial relations as an election issue
The Howard Government's announcement to the parliament, on 26 May 2005, that it intended to introduce new industrial relations legislation-officially known, from November 2005, when it was introduced to the House of Representatives, as WorkChoices (Stewart and Williams 2007, 31) and rushed through the Senate in early December (Singleton 2008 , 80-1)-transformed industrial relations from an issue of relatively low importance to an issue of high importance. In the Australian Election Study (AES) conducted after the October 2004 election, fewer than one-third (30 per cent) of the respondents named industrial relations as 'extremely important' when 'deciding about how to vote'; in a ranking of 12 issues, industrial relations tied for tenth. After the 2007 election, when the AES went back into the field, no fewer than two-thirds (67 per cent) of the respondents said industrial relations had been 'extremely important' when 'deciding about how to vote'; out of 11 issues, industrial relations tied for first. Asked, directly, in the 2004 survey to say which issue on the list 'was most important to you and your family during the election campaign', just 2 per cent named industrial relations; no issue on the list was less important. Asked after the 2007 election which issue had been most important, 16 per cent named industrial relations; only one issue, 'health and Medicare' (20 per cent) outranked it.
The rise of industrial relations as a voting issue was not something that simply happened in the course of the 2007 campaign. Nor was it a 'sleeper issue', as Roy Morgan Research suggested (cited in Muir 2008, 77) , stirred into wakefulness in mid-2006 after the bulk of the new, wide-ranging legislation came into effect (see Lewis 2008, 177) . Its rise dates from the government's announcement of WorkChoices and the ACTU's mobilisation against it. From an issue that at the end of 2004 had virtually disappeared from the range of concerns respondents volunteered to Morgan as among 'the three most important things the government should be doing something about' (Norton 2007-08, 25 , for the data), industrial relations was rated 'very important' by many more respondents after the first of the ACTU's advertisements-most memorably, the 'Tracy' advertisement-went to air from Saturday, 18 June 2005 than it had been for years before (Muir 2008, 66-7, 217n.19) . In a Newspoll conducted on the same weekend as the ACTU's advertising the proportion of respondents saying industrial relations was 'very important' to how they 'would vote in a federal election' was 41 per cent-a substantial rise from the 31 per cent registered by Newspoll in June 2004, the last time this question had been asked. By early October, as the government's campaign shifted up a gear, roughly half of the respondents (49 per cent) rated industrial relations 'very important'. In February 2006 the corresponding figure (48 per cent) was virtually unchanged. In October, however, it rose to 54 per cent after a second wave of ACTU ads had gone to air in June and the Labor leader, Kim Beazley, had promised to 'rip up' WorkChoices (Muir 2008, 71, 77 In an election-day poll, conducted by Auspoll, those who regarded 'industrial relations and WorkChoices' as 'very important' were 11 times more likely to vote for the Australian Labor Party (ALP) than for the Liberal-National Party (LNP); for 'global warming', the second-most important issue, the odds ratio was five (Watson and Browne 2008, 5-6) . And in the AES, conducted by mail after the election, 'industrial relations' (16 per cent) came second to 'health and Medicare' (21 per cent); but for unionised respondents and Labor voters, industrial relations was the most important issue (Bean and McAllister 2009 ).
Fear of WorkChoices
Awareness
At first, word that the government was to legislate spread slowly. But after the Prime Minister outlined the legislative changes to parliament and the ACTU started to run its television ads, word spread quickly. Earlier, in May 2005, before Howard had addressed the parliament, more than half the employees interviewed for the ACTU said they had heard 'hardly anything' (37 per cent) or 'not much' (25 per cent) about the government's 'plans to make some major changes to the industrial relations laws'. But by the beginning of July, after the unions' campaign had commenced, 83 per cent of those interviewed by Nielsen said they had 'read or heard' something 'about the federal government's changes to industrial relations, known as WorkChoices'; in a Morgan poll taken later that month, 79 per cent reported having 'read or heard about the federal government's proposed industrial relations reforms'; and in August, three-quarters of the employees interviewed for the ACTU across 41 marginal seats said they had heard 'a lot' (41 per cent) or at least 'some' (36 per cent). In subsequent polling, the proportion saying they had 'read or heard' something hardly moved; Morgan repeated its question in October 2005, and Nielsen did so several times until March 2007. Those not made aware of the government's legislation soon after Howard had spoken, it seems, were destined never to be aware of it at all.
But having read or heard about it did not necessarily mean respondents felt they knew 'about it. In the AuSSA, conducted between August and December 2005, about half the respondents said they knew 'a lot' (10 per cent) or at least 'something' (42 per cent) about the 'changes' involved in the government's 'reforming' of 'the Australian industrial relations system'. Two years later, in the AuSSA conducted between July and November 2007, these figures-'a lot' (13 per cent) or at least 'something' (47 per cent)-had increased only slightly.
Opposition
With awareness came opposition-in part, Liberal polling is said to have shown, because 'people could not understand why the reforms were necessary' (Savva 2010, 214 (19 per cent in 2005) in the sample as a whole. This is a ratio of 1.7 to the benchmark for the opponents and only 1.3 among supporters. And the more respondents thought they knew, the stronger were their feelings. Of those with 'a lot' of knowledge, 43 per cent 'strongly' disapproved in 2007, while 15 per cent 'strongly' approved. Compared with the sample as a whole, the ratio for the strong opponents was 2.9 and for the strong supporters 2.5.
Other data suggest not only that respondents were much more likely to oppose WorkChoices than to support it; they thought it 'bad for Australia', 'bad for the average worker'-a finding that by April 2007 Howard (2011 (Muir 2008, 66) , 64 per cent of the employees interviewed in marginal seats believed the changes to 'the industrial relations laws' were likely to be 'bad for the average worker' rather than 'good' (10 per cent) or would 'make no difference'. In March 2007, the 'bad' figure was 62 per cent; but by Octoberafter the government had advertised a new safety net in May and amended the legislation to incorporate it in June (Muir 2008, 28) -that figure had dropped to 51 per cent. It 'is a pity', said one supporter of the legislation, that 'the pollsters did not explore opinions about the reforms' fairness more' (Norton 2007-08, 23 Some elements of the argument were more persuasive than others. Asked in August 2005, on behalf of the ACTU, whether the 'proposed changes to employment laws will produce a stronger economy', 40 per cent of respondents agreed it would; a bare majority (50 per cent) disagreed (8 per cent did so 'strongly'). Asked in July 2005 whether 'business will benefit' from 'the new laws' and 'this will lead to more jobs', only 33 per cent of respondents in a Galaxy poll agreed it would; very few (11 per cent) thought 'the government' had 'done enough to explain the new industrial relations laws so people do not feel their jobs and conditions are threatened'. In August, asked on behalf of the ACTU whether the 'proposed changes to employment laws will produce more jobs', one-third (32 per cent) of respondents again agreed it would; nearly two-thirds (62 per cent) said it wouldn't (17 per cent believing this 'strongly'). When the question was repeated in March 2007, the gap had narrowed hardly at all: 33:58. The Newspoll story is rather different. From October 2005 to March-April 2007 it reported a variable but smaller gap-between 3 and 12 percentage points-in the proportion of respondents who thought the 'proposed changes' would be 'good' rather than 'bad' for 'creating jobs'.
It was on the question of whether WorkChoices would lead to higher wages that the government's credibility was weakest. 'From what you understand about these proposed changes', Galaxy asked respondents in July 2005, 'are you worried that employers may use the new laws to force workers into accepting lower pay and worse conditions?' Nearly two-thirds (63 per cent) of respondents said they were 'worried'. Asked a month later, on behalf of the ACTU, whether the 'proposed changes to employment laws will produce better pay', no more than 20 per cent of those interviewed agreed it would; no fewer than 75 per cent said it wouldn't (20 per cent believing this 'strongly'). When the question was repeated in March 2007, the gap had narrowed-22:66-but was still large. 
The unions
Marginalising collective bargaining through WorkChoices meant reducing the presence of unions; indeed, for leading members of the government, reducing the power of unions in the workplace mattered most (see Aubin 1999, 91ff; Errington and van Onselen 2007, 187, 270) . But respondents rejected this goal too. With attitudes since the 1980s becoming more-not less-'pro-union' (Peetz 2006, 40) And in the face of a WorkChoices agenda designed both 'to make it easier for corporations to legally exclude union officers' and to discourage 'collective bargaining by exposing unions and their members to fines and damages' (Peetz 2006, 135-6, 193) , twothirds (67 per cent and 68 per cent, respectively) of those interviewed for the ACTU in February-March 2006 and March 2007 supported 'laws that allow unions to enter workplaces' while 64 per cent and 58 per cent, respectively, opposed 'laws making it easier for the government and employers to sue or fine unions and workers when they take industrial action'.
Unfair dismissal
Another point of contention-one with a much higher profile for small business, the Your Rights at Work campaign and for the media generally-was the unfair dismissal laws. Asked if they agreed with the proposal 'that unfair dismissal laws should be abolished for employers with 100 staff or less', two-thirds of those interviewed by Morgan in July 2005 (67 per cent) and again in October (71 per cent) said they disagreed. In the ACTU surveys, roughly three-quarters of the respondents in Some attributed the 'predictably low levels of support for change' to the inevitable outcome of 'pollsters' inquiries on unfair dismissal laws' that formulated 'at least partly leading questions' (Norton 2007-08, 24) . Others were emboldened to see in the unfair dismissal laws the 'strongest and clearest' opposition to WorkChoices (van Wanrooy 2007, 198; Wilson 2005, 291) . Argument and counterargument, reframing the issue in the ACTU's March poll, shifted the AuSSA figures but didn't turn them around-the majority of respondents (59:30) saying they were more inclined to agree with the unions' argument that 'every worker no matter what the size of the business should be protected from unfair dismissal' than with the government's argument that 're-introducing unfair dismissal laws would cost jobs and be an unnecessary burden on small business'. By March 2007, faced by 'almost daily adverse reports' in the media of the 'unpopular impacts' of WorkChoices (Lewis 2008, 180) and adverse polling (Howard 2011, 583) , the government was forced to act. But Liberal Party research is said to have suggested that far from mollifying voters, the move was 'seen as a trick or ploy to win the election'-a sign that Howard cared about his 'battlers' not 'as people-just as voters' (Savva 2010, 217, 273 
Support
Notwithstanding widespread objection to most aspects of WorkChoices-and many aspects, far from not being 'truly put to the test publicly ' (van Wanrooy 2007, 176) , were tested in the polls before the legislation was introducedsome aspects did appear to meet with majority approval. One was the idea that employees would 'be able to cash in two weeks of their annual leave'. (Muir 2008, 77) . Asked, in a post-election poll for the ACTU, whether they had 'changed the party' they 'intended to vote for because of the IR laws', 13 per cent said they had. 
Structural, political and attitudinal cleavages
WorkChoices was one of the key issues in the 2007 election. It also raised the profile of the trade union movement after a long period of dormancy (SpiesButcher and Wilson 2011) and with a membership in steep decline (Muir 2008, 9, 15; Peetz 2006, 54) . Not since the 1998 waterfront dispute (Trinca and Davies 2000) had the sight of trade unionists marching in the streets and rallying around the countryside featured so strongly. In terms of the amount of money spent by the union movement on television advertising (Muir 2008, 39-40) not to mention market research, Australia had never seen anything like it.
Are the divisions that WorkChoices brought to the fore reflected in the survey data-in particular, divisions related to labour-market location and the workplace? Where in this do broader social divisions around income and class identity fit? Do voting patterns supplant or augment these divisions? And what other aspects of industrial relations mattered most when respondents assessed their opposition to-or support for-WorkChoices?
To answer these questions, we fit three models to responses to the 2007 AuSSA question on WorkChoices. In each case the outcome being modelled (using multinomial logistic regression) 1 is the approval scale, ranging from 'strongly approve' to 'strongly disapprove'. The first is a structural model, involving demographic variables-sex, age, education, income and occupation-and variables related to the workplace: employment sector (public/private), industry type, workplace status (supervisory/non-supervisory) and union membership. The second is a political model, incorporating not just voting intention but also class identity, social status and political self-placement (from left to right).
1 Approval scales are often modelled using ordinal logistic regression, but particular statistical assumptions must be satisfied (the 'proportional odds assumption') to use this approach. The failure of this assumption with these data required that we fit either a multinomial logistic model (in which the ordinality of the data is ignored) or a binomial logistic model (with just two categories, for and against). We favoured the first option because it retained more information about the strength of opinion-something highly relevant in this context.
The third is an attitudinal model, which incorporates several other items on industrial relations issues from the AuSSA study. The top-line results from all the substantive items have been noted already.
The way in which these models relate to each other is important. Each model adds to the previous one, such that as one moves from structural to political to attitudinal, the net effect of each variable in the preceding model is weakened. Our interest lies in the extent to which the structural variables still have some purchase as we incorporate more of the political and attitudinal variables. Since the attitudinal variables are more highly correlated with the issue of WorkChoices, they are bound to become quite dominant in the third model. This model also has the usual problems of circularity, of trying to explain attitudes by recourse to attitudes, without being at all certain as to which attitudes come first (contrast van Wanrooy 2007, 183-4) . Nevertheless, the strength of various associations-even when they cannot be deemed effects-is of value because it helps map the terrain on which the battle over WorkChoices was fought.
The multinomial models are shown in detail in Appendix 9.1 where both coefficients and standard errors are presented. Here the results are shown in Table 9 .1 as relative risk ratios. As with odds ratios, they need to be understood in terms of two sets of contrasts. One contrast is between what respondents say about the dependent variable-those who 'strongly approve', 'approve', 'disapprove' or 'strongly disapprove' of WorkChoices are contrasted with the neutral position: 'neither approve nor disapprove'. This, in turn, is based on another contrast between the various categories of the explanatory variable;for example, in the structural model the figure '1.5' for retired persons in the 'strongly disagree' category means a person who was retired (compared with someone not yet retired) was 1.5 times or 50 per cent more likely to 'strongly disagree' with WorkChoices rather than to feel neutral about it. As it happens, the same person was 1.2 times more likely to 'strongly agree' with WorkChoices than to feel neutral about it. There is nothing illogical in this. Moreover, most of the small differences between the relative risk ratios and 1.0 are not statistically significant; as a glance at the standard errors in Appendix 9.1 shows, neither 1.2 nor 1.5 differs significantly from 1.0 (though since these are shown as coefficients what matters is the difference from 0.0). Where the ratios are larger, the most common pattern is for one end of the scale ('strongly agree' or 'strongly disagree') to be dominant; with union membership, for example, the ratios are 0.4 for 'strongly agree' and 6.2 for 'strongly disagree'. Generally, one looks for relative risk ratios that are large (more than 2.0) and, where the sentiment is unimodal, one reads off which category of the variable favours that sentiment. Where possible, the omitted category, which forms the basis of the comparison, is a middle or neutral category or a category with little intrinsic interestfor example, 'other'. But some variables need to be treated with caution. For example, in Table 9 .1 the high ratios for respondents aged fifty-five to sixtyfour (8.8) and sixty-five or over (6.4) who 'strongly approve' of WorkChoices are derived by comparing their responses with those aged eighteen to twentyfive-a group that 'strongly opposes' WorkChoices. If a different age group had been chosen as the reference group, the ratios for the older groups would be considerably lower. Voting intention is different. The coding scheme used here ('effects coding') compares each category with the group mean. This is more meaningful for voting since a comparison with those who intend to vote 'other' (that is, for a minor party) is not particularly informative.
Multinomial logit results are best presented as predicted probabilities-an approach that presents figures in a more meaningful light. The probabilities are predicted by 'plugging' values into most of the variables in the model equation. These values are generally the modal value or the mean, while other variables in which we are interested are allowed to assume different values so as to illustrate the strength of particular effects. In Table 9 
Structural model
Our interest lies in the extent to which various demographic differences explain attitudes to WorkChoices. In the case of the relative risk ratios (Table 9 .1) it makes sense to present the divisions at their sharpest-hence, the contrast of oldest to youngest, lowest income to highest income, and so on. This allows us to illustrate the strength of these divisions most dramatically. It also allows us to examine how much these divisions weaken as additional variables (political and attitudinal) are included.
Beginning with age and the long version of the scale, we see a strong contrast in the level of agreement-especially strong agreement-between older respondents (fifty-five plus) and the youngest group (eighteen-twenty-four). This would be weaker had we chosen a middle-aged group as our reference; however, our choice of reference group helps draw attention to how wary younger respondents were of WorkChoices-its impact on the wages and working conditions of the young were highlighted in the media throughout the campaign (see Muir 2008, 188-90 , for the unions' attempt to target young voters)-and how supportive older respondents were of it (contrast the discussion, based on bi-variate data, in Wilson 2005, 286 ). The retirement variable shows that the association with age is not wholly reducible to a lack of contact with the workplace. Neither is the association with age the result of job seniority, since managerial positions are also included in the model. The addition of a variable for voting intention shows older supporters of the Coalition were not the only ones causing the association with age (Goot and Watson 2007 , Table A2 ), though they certainly influenced it (the relative risk ratio drops from 6.4 to 4.0 when voting is included).
Union membership is one of the strongest associations in the model; the differences across panels in Table 9 .2 are quite pronounced. But within panels, there is still a considerable age association: for current union members disapproving of WorkChoices (short scale), it is 19 percentage points between the under twenty-fives and those aged sixty-five or more; however, except when compared with the over sixty-fives, the under twenty-fives are not all that different from the other age groups. For previous union members, the age gap between youngest and oldest is still very large (25 percentage points), but again the gap is much less evident in relation to the other age groups. Among those who were never union members the gap between youngest and oldest is just as large, but the distinctiveness of young people is more evident, with a gap of at least 8 percentage points between them and any other age group. The upshot of all this is that, irrespective of how one presents the relative risk ratios, the age association is a strong one, even in the presence of the variable with the largest impact in the model.
By way of contrast, consider Table 9 .3, which focuses on position in the workplace-as a manager, supervisor or neither. This cleavage is not an important one (as the relative risk ratios in Table 9 .1 show) and the differences across panels do not amount to much. But within panels the age effect (short scale) is again large: 25 to 27 percentage points (youngest respondents compared to oldest).
What of the labour-market divisions between the professional-managerial class, blue-collar workers and other (mainly clerical and 'pink-collar') workers?
The relative risk ratios in Table 9 .1 suggest only weak associations between occupation and responses to WorkChoices. The predicted probabilities confirm this: differences within panels (that is, between occupations) are trivial compared with the differences between panels (Table 9 .4). In the case of workplace position, neither the differences between panels nor the differences within panels are substantial (Table 9 .5). In short, divisions around the labour market and workplace do not count for much. 
Political model
With our second model, the results become more interesting, not least because they cast doubt on the claim that public opinion on industrial relations reform is 'unideological' (Norton 2005, 38) and confirm the importance-even in a 'post-ideological' age-of the categories 'left' and 'right' (Goot 2005, 108ff; Noel and Therien 2008, Ch. 2) . While those identifying as 'working class' are more inclined than those with no class identification to support WorkChoices-as, more predictably, are the 'upper class'-neither result is statistically significant; and most of the relative risk ratios (around 1.0) among those who 'strongly disagree' with WorkChoices show no relationship either. As Table 9 .1 also shows, however, when it comes to thinking of themselves as 'left' or 'right', the results are more striking. Those who place themselves on the right (7-10 on a 10-point scale) strongly support WorkChoices (a relative risk ratio of 4.0 compared with those in the middle of the scale), while those on the left (0-3 on the scale) are strongly opposed (a relative risk ratio of 5.1). These effects are independent of voting intention. The relative risk ratio for Coalition respondents who supported WorkChoices is 3.8; for Labor respondents who opposed it, 2.8. We can illustrate these differences with predicted probabilities. For self-assigned class, stratified by union membership, there are trivial differences within panels but big differences between panels (Table 9 .6). On the left-right scale, by contrast, the differences within panels are generally greater than between panels. For current union members, for example, the difference between left and right in terms of opposing WorkChoices (89 per cent compared with 60 per cent) is 29 percentage points. For someone on the left, by comparison, the difference between being a union member and never having been a union member is 25 percentage points (89 per cent compared with 64 per cent). However, this doesn't apply uniformly since for someone on the right the same difference is 34 percentage points (Table 9 .7). 
Attitudes model
The inclusion of attitudes to industrial relations to explain attitudes to WorkChoices is somewhat circular unless one can establish a pattern of causality. Nevertheless, a third model, based on attitudes to industrial relations issues other than WorkChoices, is useful for exploring the issues that shaped the terrain of the struggle.
In our third model the political dynamic becomes more transparent, at least for those respondents (nearly one-third of the sample) at the extremes: 'strongly' in favour of WorkChoices or (three times as numerous) 'strongly against'. Clearly, for the small proportion of respondents who 'strongly' approved of WorkChoices, the view that 'unions should have less say in how wages and conditions are set' was a dominant consideration; Model 3 shows a relative risk ratio of 11.2 for this issue (Table 9 .1). For strong supporters, the ability of 'employees and employers…to negotiate pay and conditions directly'-understood, presumably, as a situation in which unions were absent-was also important (a relative risk ratio of 8.2). Among strong supporters of WorkChoices, disagreeing that 'individual contracts favour the employer over the employee' featured as well (a relative risk ratio of 3.8).
By contrast, those who 'strongly' disapproved of WorkChoices saw the fundamental issue as one of the powerlessness of employees vis-a-vis employers (a relative risk ratio of 7.6). The value of unions in determining 'how wages and conditions are set' was also important (a relative risk ratio of 4.2), as were the problems with direct bargaining (a relative risk ratio of 3.1).
Conclusion
Despite the long campaign around WorkChoices, there is no evidence that awareness of it grew between mid-2005 and mid-2007 or (contrary to the expectation of van Wanrooy 2007, 185 ) that views about it became increasingly polarised. On a number of issues the government was able to claw back lost ground. That support for some aspects of the legislation increased in the months leading up to the election may have reflected both the government's decision to amend its legislation and the limits of the unions' campaign. In the end, to say of the government's own advertising that 'the more the government spent, the more the public attitude turned negative' (Lewis 2009, 208 ) looks like triumphalism.
Opposition to WorkChoices was never the majority position of respondents in the polls, if we take into account the sizeable proportions who said they either had not read or heard about it or were aware of the legislation but had no view on it; but it was the majority position for those who had read or heard about it and they made up the bulk of the electorate. Nor, offered a middle option, was disapproval the majority position of respondents in the AuSSA. But as in the polls, respondents in the AuSSA were more likely to approve than disapprove and those who did disapprove were roughly three times as numerous as those who approved to do so 'strongly'. Not only was WorkChoices opposed in the polls; so too was almost every aspect of the legislation and the assumptions behind it. From mid-2005, when the legislation made its initial impact on the parties' standing in the polls, those who mentioned WorkChoices in connection with their party choice were much more likely to be (intending) Labor voters than (intending) Liberal voters.
Hugh Mackay, a qualitative researcher, acknowledges that, in the opinion polls, reaction to the legislation was 'deeply unpopular'. But in his research the 'initial [sic] response' in 2006 was 'rather muted ', even 'acquiescent' (2008, 250-1) . This is a puzzle the polls, in the nature of the case, can do little to solve. Howard, too, notes that in 2006 Liberal MPs 'suggested no great public resentment against WorkChoices'. He 'regularly telephoned' those in marginal seats and '[t]o a man and a woman virtually, they said that few people raised particular cases with their offices, and the general advice I continued to receive was that…we should stick it out and eventually public opinion would come around' (Howard 2011, 583) . But by the time of the NSW election, in March 2007, Howard's biographer and Liberal candidate Pru Goward acknowledged that WorkChoices had done the Liberals damage-'that a discredited state government could campaign on a federal issue, and get away with it, surely meant that Work Choices was poison' (Megalogenis 2008, 339 ).
In the electoral battle over WorkChoices, the ACTU set the terms of the debate. Had the Liberals succeeded in framing the debate, much of the unions'-and Labor's-campaign might have been blunted. The extent to which the polls adopted one side's agenda rather than the other's is another matter. If Howard saw the new laws as a way of boosting employment (Howard 2011, 487, 547, 573, 583-4) , perceptions of the impact WorkChoices might have on employment were something to which the newspaper polls paid little attention. On the other hand, 'fear of job insecurity'-the fear that 'would destroy WorkChoices' (Kelly 2009, 384; also Savva 2010, 223 )-didn't figure much in the published polls either. That Labor adopted the ACTU's framing and was able to convince much of the electorate of its commitment to the abolition of WorkChoices is important. Among those who argue that since the early 1980s the economic policies of the Coalition and Labor have converged around neo-liberalism, not all are prepared to concede that WorkChoices-an issue that goes to the foundations of the Liberal and Labor parties-constitutes an exception (see, for example, Lavelle 2010, 61-2; Lewis 2008, 169, 184) . Nonetheless, industrial relations along with education and climate change were the issues Rudd singled out as the key issues on which Labor sought to distinguish itself from the Liberals (van Onselen and Senior 2008, 24) . While it may be an exaggeration to say that under Rudd WorkChoices was 'dismantled' (Dyrenfurth and Bongiorno 2011, 189; cf. Megalogenis 2008, 349) , according to critics on the right, not only was WorkChoices swept away, the new broom left the labour market 're-regulated' (Howard 2011, 659) .
Were respondents concerned more with the impact of the legislation on society as a whole or on their own self-interest? According to Andrew Norton (2007 -08, 20-2, also 2005 -from the right, ironically-social solidarity trumped selfinterest. According to Shaun Wilson, ironically on the left, and Peter Wilson, a key player in the ACTU's advertising campaign, opposition to the legislation has to be understood in terms of the personal impact respondents thought the changes were likely to make (Wilson 2005, 285, 292, 294, 296, 297; Lewis 2009, 209) . Much of the media's analysis also took it as self-evident that self-interest was the principal driver (see, for example, Megalogenis 2008, Snapshot #17) . The survey evidence, however, supports the view that social solidarity was more important. While many respondents thought the legislation would leave them worse off-something Howard had not been able to deny (Megalogenis 2008, 341 )-their numbers were not nearly as large as the numbers who said they opposed the legislation.
The presence of electoral cleavages-or their absence-around WorkChoices tells us a good deal about contemporary Australian politics and society. Younger respondents, many of them relatively new entrants to the workforce, felt especially vulnerable; they were one of the unions' target groups (Muir 2008, 65, 188-90) . The importance of union membership itself in structuring views about WorkChoices should not surprise. As the strongest and certainly most consistent predictor of Labor voting (Goot and Watson 2007, 270) , union membership was not only the legislation's most important workplace target; it was also its most important political target. That occupation, workplace position, income and education had little bearing on attitudes suggests not that blue-collar workers supported the legislation-an assumption consistent with the notion of 'Howard's battlers'-but that they were not strongly opposed to it. This, in turn, suggests the analytical shortcoming of inferring political interests from class location (class-in-itself) rather than seeing these interests as something fashioned in struggle (class-for-itself). In their own way, both the importance of how respondents intended to vote-Liberal-National, Labor and the Greens-and the importance of their left-right self-placement testify to this. The struggle around power and the perception of power are also evident in the importance of attitudes to unions and management in explaining the strong views about WorkChoices-both for and against. There were no deep social divisions that WorkChoices tapped into. Rather, it was an ideological struggle with the lines between left and right, Labor and the Coalition, unions and bosses drawn quite sharply. Views about WorkChoices mapped onto demographics only in relation to age and union membership; other class, labour-market and workplace divisions did not feature. The struggle itself-in particular, the mobilisation by the labour movement-was crucial. The terrain of power and individual vulnerability shows how industrial relations attitudes played out.
For the supporters of WorkChoices, the core issues were union power and the freedom to bargain. Individual powerlessness did not feature in this perspective. Among opponents of WorkChoices, by contrast, unions were seen not as part of the problem but as facilitators, with the key issue the vulnerability of individuals in the workplace-a vulnerability that required unions for protection and exposed the risk of individual contracts that WorkChoices sought to promote. This was a prominent theme in the ACTU television campaign, which emphasised the vulnerability of the individual worker. It is no surprise, then, that the ACTU was able to mobilise so effectively against WorkChoices by exploiting themes of fear: the fears were real, and were keenly felt by many.
Looking back to the 1980s and 1990s, the 'remarkable period in which economic policies could be implemented in defiance of public opinion but without causing electoral defeat', Norton suggests that 'the political conditions for further reform' will only re-emerge when economic conditions are 'sufficiently bad ' (2007-08, 27) . But while much of the prosperity that characterised the Howard years has disappeared, and calls for the resurrection of WorkChoices are not difficult to hear, the political conditions that might lead to the reintroduction of such legislation-a Coalition government in control of the Senate, a union movement without resources and a Labor opposition wholly indifferent to mobilised opinion-are not presently on the horizon. 
